A closer reading of Ben Melech's four early sources: what are we looking for?

In a previous post, there is discussion related to Rav Leib Mintzberg's citing the four early sources on pages 90-91 (Rashba, Chovos Ha-Levavos, Akeidas Yitzchak and Ramchal), to support his contention that you MUST do hishtadlus and are not allowed to jettison (all?) histadlus and rely solely on HKBH to intervene on your behalf.

We had said that considering that we don't know many people who are driven to forsake all hishtadlus in their belief that since everything is governed by HKBH's will anyway, there is no need for them to get off the couch, we thought that the scenario laid out in Ben Melech was a diversion from what we thought the main thrust would be. We pointed out that it would be a much more realistic scenario to discuss a person, who in his working on his bitachon has decided to do a minimal amount of histadlus, way below the level of histadlus that he has done in the past.

We also detected that the force with which Rav Mintzberg went about proving what is basic and simple, was much greater than the effort expended to validate his novel ideas that followed. We were left with the impression that the proofs that hishtadlus is mandatory, were meant to be used in proving that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam. Verifying whether this impression has any validity is very worthwhile for our understanding of Rav Mintzberg's thinking on histadlus, but it will take some effort.

To be clear. We are not questioning that Rav Mintzberg's point i.e. that bitachon does not relieve you of the responsibility to engage in appropriate hishtadlus, is valid. Just that is almost unnecessary.

Especially, when you consider what R. Bachya pointed out in Chovos Halevavos, that histadlus is required, because cause and effect are the way HaShem programmed the world to work and even this fellow who is relying on a miracle, is also doing some level of hishtadlus. For example, when the fellow just described, opens the envelope containing the inheritance check with his name on it, from a great-uncle that he didn't know he had or when he goes out and buys what he needs or even when he picks up the soup spoon; he is involved in hishtadlus.

ואם תהיינה הסיבות נעדרות בכלל, לא תיגמר יציאת דבר מן הפעולות הטבעיות אל גדר ההוויה. וכאשר נסתכל בצורך האדם לסבב ולהתגלגל ולגמור ענייניו, נמצאהו בראות העין, כי הצריך אל המזון, כשיושם לפניו המאכל כראוי לו, אם לא יתגלגל לאוכלו בהגבהתו אל פיו ולעסו - לא ישבר רעבונו. וכן הצמא בצורכו אל המים. וכל שכן אם יימנע המאכל ממנו עד שיתגלגל לתקנו בטחינה ולישה ואפיה והדומה לה, ויותר גלגול מזה וקשה, אם יצטרך לקנותו ולתקנו,

"And if the means are blocked, none of the actions which normally bring this matter into existence will succeed. When we examine the need for a man to pursue means and exert himself to complete his needs, we can see with our own eyes that for one who needs food and proper food is served before him, if he does not exert himself to eat it by lifting the food to his mouth, chewing it, etc., he will not break his hunger. Likewise for someone thirsty, who needs water. And all the more so, if he has no food prepared, until he needs to exert himself through milling flour, kneading, baking, etc . And more so, if he needs to buy the food and prepare it."

So nobody can claim to be living a hishtadlus free existence. (note: For some reason, many people have this idea that hishtadlus only has to do with how you get the money to do what you want, but that everything after that is not an area where you need to think about hishtadlus).

In looking for an explanation for why Ben Melech might start with the outlier case of someone who doesn't do any histadlus, we wondered whether Rav Mintzberg might hold the position that a person who only does minimal hishtadlus is the moral equivalent of the no-histadlus person, in that he is also relying on HaShem performing a miracle on his behalf (note: Rav Mintzberg never comes out and says this). If that is true, then the next step is to ascertain whether the four sources brought in Ben Melech to prove that not doing any hishtadlus is defying the ratzon Hashem, can also be brought as proof that doing minimal hishtadlus is also in contravention of HaShem's will. If we can show that the proofs additionally work to prove that minimal hishtadlus is the moral equivalent of doing no hishtadlus whatsoever, we can understand why Ben Melech would introduce the discussion of hishtadlus using the case of the person not doing any hishtadlus. Since the case of doing no hishtadlus is so much clearer, it is an excellent way of demarcating the playing field where we will examine the minimal limits of hishtadlus

If it can be proven that the proofs can be used to invalidate both the no hishtadlus and minimal hishtadlus positions, then these proofs come very close to endorsing the position explicated in Ben Melech, that proper hishtadlus is b'darko shel olam. To be able to marshal support early in the essay to what is its central theme, would itself be good enough reason to start off with the scenario as described, even if it isn't likely to be applicable in the lives of most of the people learning his sefer.

If on the other hand, Rav Mintzberg is of the opinion that no-hishtadlus and minimal hishtadlus are not comparable OR the proofs brought to undermine the validity of no-hishtadlus do not support the invalidating of minimal hishtadlus, we are left with the question we opened with at the top of this post.

So we have our work cut off for us. Examining each of the sources in turn, we will look to see whether the sources that prove that at least some hishtadlus is mandatory, will also prove Rav Mintzberg's theses about normative hishtadlus.

There is at least one indication that Rav Mintzberg cited these early sources, solely for proving that you can't just stand idly by and expect Hashem to help you, without your doing any hishtadlus and nothing more than that.

If he had meant to prove that hishtadlus had to be b'darko shel olam and that minimal hishtadlus was also defying the ratzon Hashem, he should have quoted from the passage in Chovos Halevavos below and not the quote that he inserted in Ben Melech. In the quote below, R. Bachya refers to hishtadlus through normal human endeavors as a mitzvah (note: R. Bachya further makes the point that this kind of hishtadlus involvement in normal human endeavors will not harm his bitachon., the likely reason for reducing the amount of hishtadlus being expended).

ויכון בטרדת לבו וגופו בסבה מן הסבות והסבוב עליה לעמד במצות הבורא שצוה האדם להתעסק בסבות העולם כעבודת האדמה וחרישתה וזריעתה כמו שכתוב (בראשית ב טו) ולהשתמש בשאר בעלי חיים בתועלותיו ומזוניו ובנין המדינות והכנת המזונות ולהשתמש בנשים ולבעל אותן להרבות הזרע ויהיה נשכר על כונתו בהם לאלהים בלבו ומצפונו בין שיגמר לו חפצו בין שלא יגמר לו חפצו כמו שכתוב (תהלים קכח ב) ואמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה (משנה אבות ב יב) . ויהיה בטחונו באלהים שלם ולא יזיקנו הסבוב על הסבות להבאת טרפו בהם מאומה כשהוא מכון בהם בלבו ומצפונו לשם שמים.

And he should have intention when his mind and body is occupied with one of the means of earning a living to fulfill the commandment of the Creator to pursue the means of the world, such as working the land, plowing and sowing it, as written "And G-d took the man and placed him in Gan Eden to work it and to guard it" (Bereishis 2:15), and also to use other living creatures for his benefit and sustenance, and for building cities and preparing food, and to marry a woman and have relations to populate the world. He will be rewarded for his intentions in heart and mind to serve G-d whether or not his desire is accomplished, as written "If you eat from the toil of your hands, you are praiseworthy, and it is good for you" (Tehilim 128:2), and our sages of blessed memory said "Let all your actions be for the sake of Heaven (to serve G-d)" (Avot 2:12). In this way, his trust in G-d will be intact, undamaged by the toiling in the means to earn a livelihood, as long as his intention in heart and mind is for the sake of Heaven (to do the will of G-d that the world be populated and built up).

At some future date, it would be worthwhile analyzing these four sources to answer such questions as
1. how much hishtadlus do these early sources hold is the proper amount of hishtadlus?
2. does their idea of the proper amount of hishtadlus, hint in any way to darko shel olam?
3. do they have the concept that the trip wire for having done too much hishtadlus, is when you keep doing hishtadlus to calm your nerves?
4. where does tefila fit in with hishtadlus?
5. to what degree is the success of your hishtadlus dependent on your bitachon?

Somewhat curious that we don't find this quote in Ben Melech

It is interesting and a little odd that while Ben Melech starts off with a quote from the Sifre teaching that hishtadlus is non-negotiable,

לְמַעַן יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל מַעֲשֵׂה יָדְךָ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה יכול בטל תלמוד לומר בכל אשר תעשה

nowhere do we see quoted the below excerpt from Avos D'Rabi Nosson, which places hishtadlus as a basic tenet of creation.

רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אף אדם הראשון לא טעם כלום עד שעשה מלאכה, שנאמר (בראשית ב') ויניחהו בגן עדן לעבדה ולשמרה, והדר מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל (אבות דרבי נתן יא א)

Rav Yitchak Berkovitz on Hishtadlus

In an interview with Rav Yitzchak Berkovitz of The Jerusalem Kollel, he is quoted as saying the following about hishtadlus:  The first relates to the difficult question of how to find the correct balance between bitachon, trust, and hishtadlus, effort. As a general guide, Rav Yitzchak Berkovits suggests that the amount of effort that is considered ‘normal’ given one’s situation, is correct. For example, if it is normal for such a person to work eight hours a day, then for him to work extra hours may constitute unnecessary hishtadlus, whilst working less hours may be considered insufficient hishtadlus. However, we have now seen that the appropriate level of bitachon varies according to each person, as well as what is normal in general. Therefore, if a person develops a heightened sense of bitachon, he may, in theory, be able to reduce his work hours, and learn more, instead, based on his clear recognition that one’s livelihood ultimately comes only from God and not from work.

http://www.aish.com/tp/i/gl/133791488.html

This sounds exactly like what we've been learning in Sefer Ben Melech. 

A closer reading of Ben Melech's four early sources: Ramchal

In this final source brought in Ben Melech as support that bitachon without hishtadlus is untenable, Rav Mintzberg moves us a few hundred years forward and quotes from Mesilas Yesharim.

As with the previous three sources cited by Rav Mintzberg, we will attempt to test whether the ideas that Rav Mintzberg's presents later, such as the idea that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam can find support in Ramchal. And as we have seen previously, we may also find passages in Mesilas Yesharim that contradict Rav Mintzberg or at least cannot be proven to take one side or the other.

The fourth and last source in Ben Melech, quotes from chapter 9 in Mesilas Yesharim, where the Ramchal writes

וכך כתב הרמח״ל - ומי שירצה שלא ינהג עצמו בדרך החכמה ויפקיד עצמו לסכנות הנה אין זה בטחון אלא הוללות, והנה הוא חוטא במה שהוא עושה נגד רצון הבורא יתברך שמו, שרוצה שישמור האדם את עצמו, ונמצא שמלבד הסכנה המוטבעת בדבר אשר הוא עלול אליה מפני חסרון שמירתו, הנה עוד הוא מתחייב בנפשו בקום עשה בחטא אשר הוא חוטא, ונמצא החטא עצמו מביאו ליענש. ואולם השמירה הזאת וזאת היראה המיוסדת על הנהגת החכמה והשכל היא הראויה, שעליה נאמר ׳ערום ראה רעה ונסתר ופתיים עברו ונענשו׳(משלי כב). אך היראה השוטה היא שיהיה האדם רוצה להוסיף שמירות על שמירות ויראה על יראה ועושה משמרת למשמרתו, באפן שיגיע מזה בטול לתורה ולעבודה(מסילת ישרים פרק ט)

"One who allows himself not to be guided by wisdom and exposes himself to dangers is displaying not trust, but recklessness; and he is a sinner in that he flouts the will of the Creator, blessed be His Name, who desires that a man protect himself. Aside from the fact that because of his carelessness he lays himself open to the danger inherent in the threatening object, he openly calls punishment down upon himself because of the sin that he commits thereby, so that his hurt results from the sin itself.

The type of fear and self-protection which is appropriate is that which grows out of the workings of wisdom and intelligence. It is the type about which it is said (Proverbs 22:3), "The wise man sees evil and hides, but the fools pass on and are punished." "Foolish fear" is a person's desiring to multiply protection upon protection and fear upon fear, so that he makes a protection for his protection and neglects Torah and Divine service."

We thought that we could make the case in showing that Ramchal was in general in favor of hishtadlus. Perhaps not to the degree of R. Yitzchak Arama, but conceivably as much as R. Bachya. We see that Ramchal speaks of recklessness as flouting the will of Hashem and proclaims the need for behaving with wisdom in human endeavors. So we thought that we were well on the road to claiming that Ramchal not only supports Rav Mintzberg's basic premise of the need for hishtadlus in all human pursuits, but would also support the concept of the b'darko shel olam type of hishtadlus favored by Rav Mintzberg.

At this point, Naftali interjected that he thought that we were missing a key point in understanding what Ramchal was driving at. First of all, Naftali pointed out, Ramchal in this chapter of Mesilas Yesharim is not addressing bitachon VS. hishtadlus, he is concerned with laziness VS. diligence. In which case, Ramchal may be a vote for being industrious and not falling into the trap of laziness, instead of being a vote for obligatory levels of hishtadlus accompanying bitachon. Naftali then continued with another winning argument for not taking more from Mesilas Yesharim then what is written. Naftali's point is that the Mesilas Yesharim is describing a situation involving real danger. In which case it would be a chiyuv and mitzvah to do hishtadlus to save yourself. So while we can take from here that Ramchal holds that in the case of a mitzvah rabba like v'nishmartem l'nafshosaichem (a great mitzvah like "guard your soul"), you cannot rely on miracles or near-miracles, that is not a novel idea (either as per Rambam or because when you are faced with a mitzvah, then surely you must do absolutely ALL the hishtadlus possible and necessary to be pass the nisayon and fulfill the mitzvah. The only parameters for deciding when to dis-continue the hishtadlus, are the existing halachic guidelines for the specific mitzvah).

So it looks like we've been spun 180 degrees. Instead of finding support for making normal hishtadlus mandatory, we're seriously questioning whether Ramchal can even be brought as a proof to the idea that a minimal amount of hishtadlus is required, if only so that you aren't violating the dictum of the Chazal that one is not permitted to rely on miracles. A plausible way out of this would be to decide that almost every action (or in this case inaction) would lead to the kind of very bad situations which would border on the downright dangerous. In which case, once again, the mitzvah would demand that hishtadlus be the order of the day.

Supporting this idea that Ramchal can't be brought to support hishtadlus across the board, is what Ramchal writes in the 21st chapter of Mesilas Yesharim, where he basically comes out and says that a minimal amount of hishtadlus is all that is required and indeed proper.

אמנם מה שיוכל לשמור את האדם ולהצילו מן המפסידים האלה הוא הבטחון, והוא שישליך יהבו על ה' לגמרי, כאשר ידע כי ודאי אי אפשר שיחסר לאדם מה שנקצב לו, וכמו שאז"ל במאמריהם (ביצה ט"ז): כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו מראש השנה וגו', וכן אמרו (יומא ל"ח): אין אדם נוגע במוכן לחבירו אפילו כמלא נימא, וכבר היה אדם יכול להיות יושב ובטל והגזירה (גזירת קיצבת מזונות שקצבו לו בראש השנה) היתה מתקיימת, אם לא שקדם הקנס לכל בני אדם, (בראשית ג): בזעת אפך תאכל לחם, אשר על כן חייב אדם להשתדל איזה השתדלות לצורך פרנסתו, שכן גזר המלך העליון, והרי זה כמס שפורע כל המין האנושי אשר אין להמלט ממנו.

על כן (הואיל וכך גזר המלך) אמרו (ספרי): יכול אפילו יושב ובטל (יראה סימן ברכה) תלמוד לומר: בכל משלח ידך אשר תעשה (שצריך אתה להשתדל ולעשות), אך לא שההשתדלות הוא המועיל, אלא שהשתדלות מוכרח, וכיון שהשתדל הרי יצא ידי חובתו, וכבר יש מקום לברכת שמים שתשרה עליו ואינו צריך לבלות ימיו בחריצות והשתדלות, הוא מה שכתב דוד המלך ע"ה (תהלים ט"ה): כי לא ממוצא וממערב ולא וגו', כי אלהים שופט וגו' ושלמה המלך ע"ה אמר (משלי כ"ג): "אל תיגע להעשיר מבינתך חדל". אלא הדרך האמיתי הוא דרכם של החסידים הראשונים עושים תורתן עיקר ומלאכתן תפלה, וזה וזה נתקיים בידם, כי כיון שעשה אדם קצת מלאכה משם והלאה אין לו אלא לבטוח בקונו ולא להצטער על שום דבר עולמי, אז תשאר דעתו פנויה ולבו מוכן לחסידות האמיתי ולעבודה התמימה.

"However, a man can be protected against these deterrents and rescued from them by trusting to G-d, by casting his lot with Him in the realization that a person can never be deprived of what has been set aside for him, as our Sages of blessed memory have said (Beitzah 16a), "A man's entire sustenance is determined for him on Rosh Hashana ..." and (Yoma 38b), "A man cannot touch even a hairsbreadth of what has been set aside for his neighbor." A man could sit idle and what was ordained for him would materialize, were it not for the penalty imposed upon all men: "With the sweat of your brow shall you eat bread" (Genesis 3:19), because of which, by Divine decree, a man is required to exert himself somewhat for his sustenance. This is a tax, as it were, which must be paid by every member of the human race and which cannot be evaded. In the words of our Sages of blessed memory (Sifrei), "I would think that a man would be permitted to sit idle, had we not been told (Deuteronomy 28:20), `With all the putting forth of your hand which you undertake.' " This is not to say that the exertion produces the results, but that it is necessary. Once one has exerted himself, however, he has fulfilled his responsibilities and made room for the blessing of Heaven to rest upon him, and he need not consume his days in striving and exertion. As King David, may Peace be upon him, said (Psalms 75:7,8), "For not from east or west and not from the wilderness comes uplifting. This one He puts down and this one He lifts up. For G-d rules." And King Solomon, may Peace be upon him, said (Proverbs 23:4), "Do not weary yourself to become rich; cease from your understanding." The correct approach in this area is that of the early Saints, who made their Torah primary and their labor secondary, and were successful in both; for once a man does a little work, from then on he need only trust in his Master and not be troubled by any worldly matters. His mind will then be free and his heart ready for true Saintliness and pure Divine service."

Clearly, the implication of this passage is that the less hishtadlus you do, the better. Which supports the minimalist approach to hishtadlus. Possibly, we can differentiate between what the Ramchal wrote in chapter 9 in favor of hishtadlus and chapter 21 where he wrote disparagingly of hishtadlus is that in chapter 9 we are talking about a person towards the beginning of his climb in avodas Hashem and thus still at the level where he needs to be actively involved with hishtadlus, while chapter 21 is at the level of saintliness and therefore hishtadlus is best to be minimized. While Naftali will tell you that the difference between chapter 9 which demands active involvement in hishtadlus and chapter 21 that has very little use for hishtadlus is that chapter 9 is talking about a chiyuv or a mitzvah, while chapter 21 is not talking about a chiyuv or a mitzvah.

However, this may not be the end of the story and we shouldn't take it to be as simple and open and shut as it reads at face value, because as Rav Moshe Chaim Shlanger, Mashgiach Ruchni of Yeshivat Porat Yosef, in his running commentary on Mesilas Yesharim  points out,

"a little work" - Rabeinu's intent is not that a person do a tiny effort and then rely on a miracle. Rather, it makes sense that the amount [of hishtadlus] is what one needs according to the ways of nature to attain his [basic] needs. He comes only to preclude that "he does not need to consume his days in exertion and labor"...

אמנם נראה, שאין כוונת רבינו לומר שדי לשם השגת פרנסה בעשיית דבר מועט ממש ואח"כ לסמוך על הנס, אלא מסתבר שהשיעור הןא בהשתדלות מזערית שתספיק בדרך הטבע למלא את צורכי האדם. כן משמע גם מדבריו כאן שבא להוציא רק מ"לבלות ימיו בחריצות והשתדלות" ולא מהשתדלות טבעית

וכן נראה מדבריו בפֶּרֶק ו' - בְּבֵאוּר מִדַּת הַזְּרִיזוּת והנה שלמה שנה מאד באזהרתו על זה בראותו את רוע העצלה וההפסד הגדול הנמשך ממנה ואמר (משלי ו): מעט שנות מעט תנומות מעט חבק ידים לשכב, ובא כמהלך ראשך ומחסרך כאיש מגן. כי הנה העצל אף על פי שאינו עושה רע בקום עשה, הנה הוא מביא את הרעה עליו בשב ואל תעשה שלו.

ואמר (שם יח): גם מתרפה במלאכתו, אח הוא לבעל משחית. כי אף על פי שאיננו המשחית העושה את הרעה בידיו, לא תחשוב שהוא רחוק ממנו, אלא אחיו הוא ובן גילו הוא.

והנה מלבד פשוטו אשר הוא אמיתי כמשמעו שהוא מה שקורה אל שדה העצל ממש...

and in a similar vein, he writes in chapter 6 in defining the Trait of Zeal.

"Behold, Shlomo repeatedly exhorted many times on this in seeing the evil of laziness and the greatness of the harm resulting from it. He said "a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to rest. Then shall your poverty come as a traveler.." (Mishlei 24:33). For behold, even though the lazy person is not doing evil actively, nevertheless he brings evil on himself through his very inactivity."

"Shlomo further said: "also he who is slack in his work is a brother to the destroyer" (Mishlei 18:9). For even though this person is not a destroyer who commits evil directly with his own hands, don't think he is far removed from being one. On the contrary, he is the destroyer's brother, and his comrade."

"He further used a familiar, every day illustration to explain the evil that befalls the lazy person: "I passed by the field of a lazy man, and by the vineyard of the man without understanding; And, lo, it was all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered the face of it, and its stone wall was broken down; Then I observed; I put my heart to it; I beheld and I received mussar (instruction); A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to lie down; so shall your poverty come as a traveler, and your want like a man with a shield" (Mishlei 24:30-34)."

"Besides the plain meaning, which is true in the literal sense, for this is indeed what happens to the field of a lazy man."

Indicating that the lack of success comes from being lazy [and not doing the proper hishtadlus]. The implication being that if the person had not been lazy and had done the appropriate amount of hishtadlus, he would have met with success.

This is implied in chapter 11 - the Details of Cleanliness, as well

וכן משמע מן האמור בפרק י"א - בפרטי מדת הנקיות

ואם תאמר בלבבך: ואיך אפשר לנו שלא להשתדל במשאנו ובמתננו לרצות את חבירנו על המקח ועל שוויו? חילוק גדול יש בדבר, כי כל מה שהוא להראות את הקונים אמיתת טוב החפץ ויפיו, הנה ההשתדלות ההוא טוב וישר.

If you ask yourself, "How is it possible for us in our dealings not to attempt to favorably incline the prospective buyer towards the object to be sold and its worth?" know that there is a great distinction to be made. Whatever effort is made to show the purchaser the true worth and beauty of the object is fitting and proper

So it seems that we have come full circle. Rav Schlanger's citations imply that Ramchal would not be happy with the person whose bitachon is not accompanied by hishtadlus. We can confidently claim that Ramchal would agree with what we have been learning in Ben Melech, that proper hishtadlus is when it is done in a way that the effort expended could be expected to deliver the positive results desired.

A closer reading of Ben Melech's four early sources: Rashba

As an opening salvo in his essay on hishtadlus, Rav Leib Mintzberg came down very strongly on the side that bitachon without hishtadlus doesn't fly. He proceeded to quote from four early sources (Rashba in Teshuvos HaRashba, Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos Ha-Levavos, Rav Yitzchak Arama in Akeidas Yitzchak and Ramchal in Mesilas Yesharim) to back up his contention. see post here. Considering that this does not seem to be his main thrust in this essay on hishtadlus and in fact seems to be a diversion from what will be his main theses on hishtadlus, we are interested in seeing whether the sources that Rav Mintzberg brings, have broader application than to just the limited case of a person who wants to rely on his bitachon and to do no hishtadlus whatsoever and in Rav Mintzberg's words, is relying on miracles to fulfill his needs.

We will attempt to test whether the ideas that Rav Mintzberg's presents later, such as the idea that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam can find any support among these four early sources that were brought to prove that at least some hishtadlus is mandatory. It is also possible that we will find that these four sources actually contradict Rav Mintzberg or at least cannot be proven to take one side or the other.

In this post, we'll take a closer look at the first source cited in Ben Melech, which was from a response written by the Rashba and printed in Tshuvos HaRashba vol I, responsa #413 as well as in Minchas Kenaos letter #3

וכן כתב הרשב״א באגרתו - ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין לו רשות לעשו ת מלאכתו דרך בטחון, רק בררנו של עולם ובו', ואין זה ממעט בטחון, אדרבה אסו ר לסמוך על הנס (ספר מנתת קנאות מכתב ג׳).

We'll start our analysis by continuing to quote the Rashba, from where the quote of the Rashba in Ben Melech ends, until the end of the paragraph.

ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין לו רשות לעשות מלאכתו דרך בטחון רק בדרכו של עולם, שלא יאמר אדליק נר ביין או במים ואסמוך על הנס, ואע"פ שאמר החסיד לבתו ששגה בע"ש ושמה יין בנר במקום שמן ונצטערה, בתי אל תצטערי, מי שאמר לשמן וידליק, יאמר ליין וידליק.

We now get a totally different picture of what the Rashba said. When reading this passage in the Rashba as quoted in Ben Melech, you get the impression that even the most righteous have to do hishtadlus that is b'darko shel olam. Leaving us to interpret b'darko shel olam as Ben Melech usually does, i.e. doing the amount of hishtadlus which under normal conditions can be expected to deliver the desired results.

But by reading the extra few words, we see that while it is clear that the Rashba is still supporting the idea that a person is not allowed to rely on miracles, however, he is defining miracles quite differently than Rav Mintzberg does. He defines miracles as doing things that stray from the laws of nature and expecting that the outcome will still be as he anticipates. The Rashba's example is somewhat extreme and therefore the application to more normative situations is extremely limited. His example is of a person who lights a lamp filled with water or wine instead of oil, with the expectation that it will burn. This person is obviously looking for a real 'parting of the Red Sea' type of miracle, not your garden variety type of miracle, such as a person not having a job and opening the mail to find a check inside an envelope addressed to him, for which the explanation of the timing is quite fantastic, since he had not known that his mother had a great-uncle, who all of a sudden, in his hoary old-age, had this need to show gratitude for something that his grandmother had done almost a century before, when she knit him a sweater for his birthday, when he was six years old and everybody had been so busy trying to survive, that they had all but forgotten his birthday.

In fact, the Rashba really isn't a proof to Rav Mintzberg at all. Rav Mintzberg's strong words were aimed at condemning the person who intends to rely on his bitachon sans any hishtadlus, because the person is violating the dictum that we don't rely on miracles. However, the Rashba is talking about miracles of Biblical (or at least Talmudic) proportions, he never said anything about your ordinary plain vanilla miracles that stay well within the boundaries of the physical (and other) laws of nature. The passage from the Rashba that is cited in Ben Melech can not be taken as an indication to what the Rashba would say about a person using his bitachon to rely on what is ostensibly a plain vanilla miracle.

btw. having not thought about this enough, it would be interesting to spend the time to formulate what it is that happens that we call a miracle. It seems at first glance that what we call a miracle is all about timing. Timing as in coincidence that a seed planted many years before, sprouts results when you most need it. Timing as in things happening one after another in quick sequence to deliver a desired result. Timing as happening when you or someone else is in a particular place.

So when the Rashba states that even a very saintly person has no right to go about his chores relying on his bitachon and instead, must act only b'darko shel olam, he uses the expression b'darko shel olam to mean nothing more than doing things in a way that doesn't violate the basic laws of nature (physics etc). In addition, nothing can be extracted from the Rashba to prove anything one way or the other, about a person who does a minimal amount of hishtadlus since that is not the situation that the Rashba is addressing. The Rashba is not addressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of hishtadlus, he is stressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of not relying on miracles that break the bounds of physics.

But things are not so simple. If we take a look at the whole passage from the top, we see that in truth, the Rashba may be able to be used as support for Rav Mintzberg's ideas after all. In the passage below the Rashba writes that it is forbidden to rely on miracles. But here we read that the kind of miracle that you are forbidden to rely on, is to rely on a miracle that you can pass safely under a wall on the verge of collapse. In which case, the Rashba clearly supports Rav Mintzberg's contention that there is a hishtadlus requirement to avoid relying on miracles of even the most pedestrian kind.

וזה דרך הקמיעין בין קמיע של כתב בין של עקרין, וכן כל מ"ש בשבת ובחולין ובע"ז ובסנהדרין וגם בשאר מקומות שכתבנו למעלה, והוא שאמרו אביי ורבא כל שיש בו משום רפואה אין בו משום דרכי האמורי, ולא עוד אלא שאסור לכנוס בעניני הסכנות ולבטוח על הנס, והוא אמרו: קיר נטוי מזכיר עון, ואמרו כל הסומך על הנס אין עושין נס, ומותר לבטוח באדם, והוא שלא יסור לבו מן ה', כאמרו: ארור הגבר אשר שם בשר זרועו ומן השם יסור לבו, אך לבטוח בה' שיעשה לו תשועה על ידי איש פלוני מותר ומצוה, וזה כולל כל עסקי בני אדם במלאכתם, זולתי האנשים השלמים שזכיותיהם מרובות כמעשה דר' חנינא בן דוסא עם הערוד, שאמרו אוי לו לאדם שפגע בו ערוד, ואוי לו לערוד שפגע בו ר"א בן דוסא, וכמעשה דרבי חנינא בן דוסא (חולין ז, ב) שהיתה אותה אשה מחזרת לטול עפר מתחת רגליו לכשפים וא"ל שקילי, אין עוד לבדו כתיב, והאמר מר למה נקראו כשפים, לפי שמכחישין פמליא של מעלה? והשיב שאני ר"ח בן דוסא דנפיש זכותיה, ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין לו רשות לעשות מלאכתו דרך בטחון רק בדרכו של עולם, שלא יאמר אדליק נר ביין או במים ואסמוך על הנס, ואע"פ שאמר החסיד לבתו ששגה בע"ש ושמה יין בנר במקום שמן ונצטערה, בתי אל תצטערי, מי שאמר לשמן וידליק, יאמר ליין וידליק.

So in summary, perhaps the Rashba can be used as somewhat of a proof for denigrating the faux-bitachon in the extreme scenario that Rav Mintzberg chose to use, i.e. no hishtadlus whatsoever. Additionally, the Rashba may support Rav Mintzberg's main theses, that a person doing minimal hishtadlus is behaving badly and is showing that he has no real bitachon in HaShem. In fact, Rav Mintzberg never indicated that the Rashba supports his idea about ba'alei bitachon behaving recklessly, so we shouldn't be too surprised if the Rashba doesn't support Rav Mintzberg's idea. Likewise, it would be a serious mis-reading of the Rashba, to take from Rav Mintzberg's presentation, that the Rashba intended to use the phrase b'darko shel olam in the way that Rav Mintzberg will use it in the rest of his essay on hishtadlus.

This is important, because from the way that Ben Melech smoothly transitions from discussing the person who does no hishtadlus, to the person who does less hishtadlus than can normally be expected to deliver the positive results desired, you can get the mistaken impression that just as the four early sources support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does no hishtadlus, so too they support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does minimal hishtadlus,  when in fact, they do not. Furthermore, by cutting off the Rashba in mid-sentence and not sharing the extreme context that the Rashba is addressing i.e. a person attempting to light wine, with the expectation that it will burn like oil, Rav Mintzberg inadvertently concealed from the reader, the obvious conclusion that the Rashba did not mean to use the term b'darko shel olam to mean what Rav Mintzberg does with the term for the rest of this essay in Ben Melech.

A closer reading of Ben Melech's four early sources: Chovos HaLevavos

We've said that Rav Leib Mintzberg comes down very strongly on the side that bitachon without hishtadlus is not the appropriate approach to avodas Hashem through bitachon. We questioned why Rav Mintzberg would start with this fusillade as an introduction to hishtadlus, when you consider that this is not the primary concept that he aims to teach us about hishtadlus, as we saw as soon as we got past chapter 1. We are interested to see whether the sources that Rav Mintzberg brings, can also be used to support the more important ideas that Rav Mintzberg will put forth in the ensuing chapters.

As we learned through those concepts in hishtadlus are of real importance to Rav Mintzberg, we noticed that Rav Mintzberg did not put forward the level of proofs that he did when dealing with the basic and simple facets of hishtadlus. We will be looking to see whether the ideas that Rav Mintzberg's presents in later chapters of the essay, such as the idea that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and the idea that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam, can find any support among these same sources that were brought to prove that hishtadlus is mandatory. It is also possible that Rav Mintzberg brought those four sources to prove his limited case of bitachon sans hishtadlus and that we will find that these same four sources actually contradict some of Rav Mintzberg's later ideas or at least cannot be proven to take one side or the other.

The second source brought in Ben Melech is much more clear in support of Rav Mintzberg's point, that hishtadlus is a requirement, not an option. In Chovos Halevavos in chapter 4 of Shaar ha-Bitachon, R. Bachya writes

וכך כתב בספר חובות הלבבות - ועם בירור אמונתו בי עניינו מסור אל גזרו ת הבורא יתעלה ושבחירת הבורא לו היא הבחירה הטובה, הוא חייב להתגלגל לסיבות תועלותיו ולבחור הטוב בנראה לו מן הענין ובו׳ ולא יניח את זה על האלוקים, שיאמר, אם קדם בגזרת הבורא שאחיה ישאיר נפשי בגופי מבלי מזון בל ימי חיי, ולא אטרח בבקשת הטרף ועמלו(שער הבטחון - פרק ד).

The entire paragraph in Chovos Halevavos reads as follows: Even though a human being's end and length of his days are determined by the Creator's decree, nevertheless, it is a man's duty to pursue means to survive such as food and drink, clothing, and shelter according to his needs, and he must not leave this to the Al-mighty, and think: "if the Creator has pre-decreed that I will live, then my body will survive without food all the days of my life, therefore I will not trouble myself in seeking a livelihood and toiling in it". If one's emunah (faith) is clear, that his matters are given over to the decrees of the Creator, and that the choice of the Creator for him is the best choice, nevertheless, it is one's duty to pursue means which appear to be beneficial to him and to choose what seems to be the best choice under the circumstances, and the Al-mighty will do according to what He has already decreed.

That is about as clear a support as you can find to the idea that it isn't enough to do a minimal amount of hishtadlus and on the contrary, you are required to do hishtadlus in a way that under normal circumstances can be expected to deliver the desired results.

However, there is also an indication found in other passages in Chovos Halevavos (below), that when Ben Melech cited the Rashba, R Bachya, R Yitzchak Arama and Ramchal, it was only intended to prove that you can't just stand idly by and expect Hashem to help you, without your doing any hishtadlus and it proves nothing more than that.

The indication coming logically from the fact, that if Rav Mintzberg really was trying to prove anything more from the four early sources, besides that bitachon without any hishtadlus is just not acceptable, for example, that hishtadlus had to be b'darko shel olam he should have quoted from this passage in Chovos Halevavos and not the quote that he inserted in Ben Melech. Because here R Bachya actually refers to the hishtadlus through normal human endeavors as a mitzvah and further makes the point that this kind of hishtadlus involvement in normal human endeavors will not harm his bitachon.

It is also worth noting that in the passage below, R. Bachya portrays hishtadlus in an even more positive light than what we have seen in Ben Melech. In Ben Melech, Rav Mintzberg refers to doing hishtadlus as being the ratzon HaShem, but does not go as far as R. Bachya does in this passage, where he points out that it is a positive commandment, an actual mitzvah.

ויכווין בטרדת לבו וגופו בסיבה מן הסיבות והסבוב עליה, לעמוד במצוות הבורא שצווה האדם להתעסק בסיבות העולם בעבודת האדמה וחרישתה וזריעתה. כמו שכתוב (בראשית ב) ויקח ה' אלוהים את האדם ויניחהו בגן עדן לבדה ולשמרה... ויהיה ביטחונו באלוהים שלם, ולא יזיקנו הסיבוב על הסיבות להבאת טרפו בהם מאומה כשהוא מכווין בהם בלבו ובמצפונו לשם שמים.

And he should have intention when his mind and body is occupied with one of the means of earning a living to fulfill the commandment of the Creator to pursue the means of the world, such as working the land, plowing and sowing it, as written "And G-d took the man and placed him in Gan Eden to work it and to guard it" (Bereishis 2:15)... In this way, his trust in G-d will be intact, undamaged by the toiling in the means to earn a livelihood, as long as his intention in heart and mind is for the sake of Heaven.

An while we can’t bring a proof that R. Bachya holds that the correct way to measure proper hishtadlus is by using the darko shel olam yardstick, we do find indications that R. Bachya did not agree with the Rishonim who had an unfettered view of hishtadlus, with the sky being the limit. The other Rishonim had only one caveat; that the person who doing as much hishtadlus as he can muster, must at the same time keep in his mind and in his heart that the ultimate success of his hishtadlus, is solely dependent on HaShem’s deciding that his hishtadlus should bear fruit and be successful.

However, R. Bachya writes that a person should choose a vocation based upon the direction along which HaShem leads him and if at times his vocation doesn’t provide for his needs, he should not change the direction that he is following and should have bitachon that HaShem will always provide for his needs throughout his entire life. This would seem to indicate that you should not always be looking to maximize your hishtadlus efforts. Here are the words of R. Bachya:

ולכל אדם יש חפץ במלאכה או סחורה מבלתי זולתה. כבר הטביע האל לה בטבעו אהבה וחיבה
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ומי שמוצא במידותיו וטבעו כוסף אל מלאכה מהמלאכות, ויהיה גופו ראוי לה ויוכל לסבול את טרחה, יחזר עליה ישים אותה סיבה להבאת מזונו, ויסבול מותקה ומרירותה, ואל יקוץ כשיימנע ממנו הטרף בקצת העתים, אך יבטח באלוהים שיספיק לו טרפו כל ימי חייו. ויכווין בטרדת לבו וגופו בסיבה מן הסיבות והסבוב עליה, לעמוד במצוות הבורא שצווה האדם להתעסק בסיבות העולם בעבודת האדמה וחרישתה וזריעתה. כמו שכתוב (בראשית ב) ויקח ה' אלוהים את האדם ויניחהו בגן עדן לבדה ולשמרה.

Every man has a preference for a particular work or business over others. G-d has already implanted in his nature a love and fondness for it
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One who finds his nature and personality attracted to a certain occupation, and his body is suited for it, that he will be able to bear its demands - he should pursue it, and make it his means of earning a livelihood, and he should bear its pleasures and pains, and not be upset when sometimes his income is withheld, rather let him trust in G-d that He will support him all of his days. And he should have intention when his mind and body is occupied with one of the means of earning a living to fulfill the commandment of the Creator to pursue the means of the world, such as working the land, plowing and sowing it, as written "And G-d took the man and placed him in Gan Eden to work it and to guard it" (Bereishis 2:15)

A closer reading of Ben Melech's four early sources: Akeidas Yitzchak

The source brought in Ben Melech that is most problematic is the third source cited, that of R. Yitzchak Arama in Akeidas Yitzchak. Akeidas Yitzchak definitely supports the idea that you cannot sit back and do nothing and wait for HaShem to save you from yourself. However, even the passage quoted in Ben Melech, makes it clear that nothing less than hishtadlus to the maximum of your abilities and acuity is acceptable hishtadlus. This is definitely not the message that Rav Mintzberg is sending throughout the rest of this essay and in fact, throughout the entire sefer.

ועיין מה שכתב בספר עקידת יצחק ־ ומי לנו גדול ומשוח מלך ואהוב לאלוקיו כדוד אדונינו, אשר היה מובטח מפי נביא נאמן להי, ועם כל זה לא סר מהשתדל בכל מאמצי כוחו להנצל מכף כל אויביו ומכף שאול. ולא סמך על הבטחותיו, כי ידע כי ישועת השי״ת והבטחותיו לא יחולו רק על ראש המשלים את חוקו בפעולותיו האנושיות ככל אשר תספיק שכלו , וכאשר יחסר ממנו, כבר יפול בו מום העצלה והרישול, ויוחלש כוחו מלקבל העזר והתשועה האלוקית (פרשת וישלח שער כו).

So even while Akeidas Yitzchak holds that hishtadlus is (almost) always mandatory, the kind of hishtadlus propounded by Akeidas Yitzchak, is exactly the kind of hishtadlus that Rav Mintzberg denigrates in no uncertain terms. In Ben Melech, people who engage in this kind of hishtadlus are derided for displaying serious flaws in their bitachon. Unless you use b'darko shel olam to mean actions that do not violate the Laws of Physics (ala' Rashba), you cannot in any way, shape or form, honestly contend that Akeidas Yitzchak is suggesting that hishtadlus should be b'darko shel olam the way that it is used in Ben Melech. Darko shel olam is not even a factor in determining appropriate hishtadlus.

Akeidas Yitzchak seems to be of the opinion that what determines whether your bitachon/hishtadlus has found the correct equilibrium, has nothing to do with the actions that you take as the means of hishtadlus. The signature of a baal bitachon is that you don't lose your grip on the fact that the success of your hishtadlus is absolutely, totally reliant on HaShem's beneficence. An earlier passages in this section of Akeidas Yitzchak supports this understanding of Rav Yitzchak Arama's position.

צריך להחזיק בשני העניינים יחד. א) אם בכיוון מעשיו, וליישרם לרצון תמיד לפני ה', ואם במה שיפקח בענייניו תכלית מה שאפשר, ב) ושלא יעזוב מהחריצות וההשתדלות כמובטח על הזכות או כמתייאש, אבל יעשה עד מקום שידו מגעת ג) ולא יקווה אשר יגיעו לו מאוויי נפשו כ"א ע"י החפץ האלוהי אשר בידו הכול והכול בו. וכמ"ש החכם (משלי ט"ז) לב אדם יחשב דרכו וה' יכין צעדו. והוא מה שלמדו מרע"ה אל עם תורתו בלבם (דברים ח') וזכרת את ה' אלקיך כי הוא הנותן לך כוח לעשות חיל. כיון שהצלחת כללותם, רצוני איש איש מהם, היא תלויה בשני דברים. האחד בשיתעורר אל ההתחלות התלויות בהשתדלות כפי כוחו. והשני בשהוא ית' יהיה עמו לעוזרו ולסומכו על דרך יושר המעשים. ותוכן התפלה והתחנה בבקשה מאתו כי זה מה שיועיל לכל אדם מאיזו כת שיהיה מהחלוקות הנזכרות.

There is one thing that is clear from Akeidas Yitzchak and that is that Rav Yitzchak Arama does not subscribe to Rav Mintzberg's idea that tefila is another form of hishtadlus. as we see here:

והוא עצמו מה שביארו בהיותו במערה בכל דברי תפילתו ובפרט בסוף דבריו הבט ימין וראה ואין לי מכיר אבד מנוס ממני וכו' זעקתי אליך ה' אמרתי וכו' (שם קמ"ב). אמר שכבר פנה לבו הנה והנה להיעזר בשום השתדלות מהמעשים האנושיים, ולא מצא לא על צד ההמלט אצל שום אוהב ורע, כי אין לו מכיר, ולא להימלט את נפשו, כי אבד מנוס. ולא על דרך הפיוס והבקשה, כי אין דורש לנפשו. וכאשר כלתה אליו אפשרות ההשתדלות, מה נשאר לו רק צעקתו ותפלתו. ולזה אמר (שם) הקשיבה אל רנתי וכו'. הוציאה ממסגר נפשי וכו'.

where the Akeidas Yitzchak mentions tefila as something that you do after all avenues of hishtadlus have been exhausted.

As an aside, please take notice from this same passage, where you can perhaps bring support from the Akeidas Yitzchak to the idea in Ben Melech that when you've exhausted all of your own resources in attempting appropriate hishtadlus, a person can turn to friends and relatives for help.

והוא עצמו מה שביארו בהיותו במערה בכל דברי תפילתו ובפרט בסוף דבריו הבט ימין וראה ואין לי מכיר אבד מנוס ממני וכו' זעקתי אליך ה' אמרתי וכו' (שם קמ"ב). אמר שכבר פנה לבו הנה והנה להיעזר בשום השתדלות מהמעשים האנושיים, ולא מצא לא על צד ההמלט אצל שום אוהב ורע, כי אין לו מכיר, ולא להימלט את נפשו, כי אבד מנוס. ולא על דרך הפיוס והבקשה, כי אין דורש לנפשו. וכאשר כלתה אליו אפשרות ההשתדלות, מה נשאר לו רק צעקתו ותפלתו. ולזה אמר (שם) הקשיבה אל רנתי וכו'. הוציאה ממסגר נפשי וכו'.

The proof being that the last thing that Dovid HaMelech did before crying out to HaShem was to take stock that he had no one who loved him or even a friend with whom he could find refuge, the implication being that he wouldn't have jettisoned all hishtadlus and turned solely to Hashem, had he had friends or loved ones who would take him in. Then again, it's possible that this is only true because Akeidas Yitzchak doesn't put limits on hishtadlus.

In summary, Akeidas Yitzchak cannot be brought as support for Rav Mintzberg's idea that the way to gauge proper hishtadlus is that it be k'darko shel olam. There is no mention of a trip wire for when you've gone over the line in your attempts at hishtadlus. If there is a problem, it is in your lack of bitachon that you think that it is your acts of hishtadlus that will bring you success, instead of gezairas HaBorei. Rav Mintzberg might argue that if you do more than darko shel olam you are on thin ice, likely to think that your actions are what made it happen. But that is not what the Akeida writes.

Before leaving the Akeidas Yitzchak, I'd like to share the following paragraphs that were interspersed among many other ideas that R. Yitzchak Arama wrote on Parshas VaYishlach. For those of us who learned Emunah u'Bitachon Chazon Ish last year, it will hopefully be music to your ears, wherein the beautiful thoughts below, Rav Yitzchak Arama expresses the deep feelings that a person can be elevated to feel, when having done all the hishtadlus that he could do, and employed his bitachon to the fullest, still, he meets with failure.
 

והנה כאשר יעשה כל אשר בידו א"א על הרוב שלא יהיה לו שכר טוב בעמלו. ואם אולי שכר לא היה לו גם חכמתו לא עמדה לו בעת צרתו, הנה כבר עלה בידו דעה ובינה כי הדין דין שמים, אם על דרך העונש או הייסורין או הניסיון אי זה מהאופנים אשר ישפוט שהוא יותר קרוב לעצמו לפי מידותיו, ואיך שיהיה מהם יסבלהו ברצון ויקבל בסבר פנים.

ואם אולי זה וזה לא יעמדו לפניו כבר יצא ידי חובתו להינצל מכל מה שההצלה היתה אפשרית לו על ידו, וידע בלי ספק די אלוהיה שלח מלאכים למשקל ערבוניה מיניה ואין מנוס, ומה לעשות לו כי אם להצדיק דין שמים ולמהר לנפשו מנות הזכות והקישוט הראויות לתת לה מלפניה להשיבה אל אלוהים אשר נתנה. והקש על זה בכל המקרים והפגעים המתרגשים לבוא בעולם, הן כלליות או פרטיות. וזה הדרך ישכון אור צדיקים ילכו בם בכל המעשים אשר יעשו, והוא המסיר העצב והדאגה מכל סובלי התלאות כאשר ידעו נאמנה כי לא יד המקרה ומידת הרישול נגעה בה זולתי רצון הבורא אשר אליו יתפלל כל חסיד לעת מצוא. וכמו שהפליג לומר ע"ז המשורר רצונך אשאלה רגע ואגוע, ומי יתן ותבא שאלתי.

After note on post about Ramban's approach to doctors

In the post on this topic here, we quoted the Ramban as saying, "What place do doctors have in the house of those who carry out the will of God, after He promised that `He will bless their bread and their water, and remove illness from their midst'?... 

We pointed out that this was not the standard accepted practice and that likely, even the Ramban did not intend to render a halakhic opinion for his day and age and surely not ours. The Tur and Shulchan Aruch rendered the final halakha as being, "the Torah gave permission to doctors to heal people and it is a mitzvah and is covered under the general rule of preservation of human life;" and the ended with some choice words for those who can heal people, but don't, "and if a doctor refrains from healing someone, he is a blood spiller". (YD 336:1)

We mentioned that one Yom Kippur the Chazon Ish was not feeling well and his doctor told him that it was forbidden for him to fast on Yom Kippur. Nonetheless, the Chazon Ish fasted. There were those who found this behavior to be out of sync with his approach to this halakhic question, since he himself would insist that others in that situation must eat, since that was the ratzon Hashem. The Chazon Ish explained his behavior as follows. During the entire year we behave in the regular, normal fashion. However, on Yom Kippur we are a tefach taller (Mod. spiritually). In which case, we behave in accordance with the Ramban. (Maaseh Ish vol 3 page 175).

What must be noted however is that, the Chazon Ish did not let anybody else get away with fasting on Yom Kippur in such a situation, even for established talmidei chachamim. The stories of the Chazon Ish traveling to sick and weak people's bedsides on Erev Yom Kippur to insist that they eat on Yom Kippur and brooking no argument from them, are legion, as can be found throughout the multiple volumes of Maaseh Ish (among other places). In addition, the following should not come as a surprise to anyone. There was at least one occasion, where the Chazon Ish determined that his condition was such that he himself could fast, as long as he stayed in bed all Yom Kippur and did not daven at all. Which is fact what he did and when appropriate, advised others of the same, saying the mitvah of the day is affliction (inui) and not tefila.

Can HaMaspik Le'Ovdei HaShem be brought as support for the approach to hishtadlus in Ben Melech?

Of late, I've begun to review Rav Avraham ben HaRambam's treatise on bitachon in HaMaspik Le'Ovdei HaShem (numerous times in quick succession), with the intent of marking up my copy of Ben Melech's essay on hishtadlus with references to where Rav Avraham has the same approach. I hoped that in doing so, Sefer HaMaspik would do for us the same two things that he did for us last year, when we were learning the Chazon Ish's approach to bitachon.

1. Help us get a better understanding of the text in front us that we are learning (last year Emunah u-Bitachon Chazon Ish and this year Ben Melech on hishtadlus)
2. Provide support from an early Rishon for an approach that you could argue is a departure from the standard approaches to the subject.

As I began to underline more and more places in my copy of HaMaspik Le'Ovdei HaShem that I felt were clear support what is written in Ben Melech***, I was becoming more and more convinced that Rav Leib Mintzberg's approach to hishtadlus was just a re-stating of what is written in HaMaspik in a more modern prose.

What immediately caught my attention was that in HaMaspik, Rav Avraham describes what proper hishtadlus should look like.

216 המספיק
לאור הדברים האלה חייב איפוא שומר הדת בשעה שהוא מקדיש את חילו לגורמים טבעיים ודברים רגילים כדי להפיק מהם תועלת ולהרחיק את הזקם שיהא בטחונו על ה' יתעלה. ויהא לבו תלוי בו בהפקת התועלת שהוא מקוה לה … לפני שיקדיש להם את חילו.

216 המספיק
וצריך שיהא דבר זה חוזר ונשנה בדעתו בשעת מאמציו וקבוע בלבו כדי שלא יסטה ממנו ואז לא יהיה להוט יותר מדי אחר התועלת ולא יקדיש לה את כל מעיניו

220 המספיק
ואין כונת הפסוקים … כי מפני בטחונו רשאי שומר התורה לישב בחיבוק ידים ללא מאמץ להשגת פרנסתן

224 המספיק
ואין דברי שלמה בשבח העבודה ובגנות הבטלה מחיבים התמכרות לעניני העולם הזה שהרי אומר הוא אל תיגע להעשיר… ומה שמעוררים עליו הוא שיעבוד האדם למחיתו באמצעים רגילים בלי הפרזה והתמכרות יתירה

226 המספיק
השמר אפוא לבל תשקע ראשך ורבך בסיבות ובעבודת הפרנסה

אלא ראה את הבטחון בה' יתעלה כמחיב אותך לסמוך עליו תוך כדי עסוק באמנות רגילה, והצטמצם במלאכה פשוטה שאיננה טורדת אותך מעבודתו יתעלה ורק כדי חייך.

That Rav Avraham should come out forcefully that a person must engage in hishtadlus and cannot employ his bitachon to rely on miracles is of no surprise to anyone, but his description of appropriate hishtadlus, is the closest that I've seen in any Rishon to what Ben Melech describes as darko shel olam.

There is surely an epochal difference that is easily discernable, where Ben Melech IS different from HaMaspik, in that Rav Mintzberg takes into account modern man's more complex and different circumstances and then paints the picture for us of how they are relevant to our calculating the appropriate amount of hishtadlus to undertake. Ben Melech describes in detail, how to take these considerations into account, at a much more granular level than Rav Avraham ben HaRambam had any reason to pursue. So for example, the fact that Ben Melech mentions additional criteria for fine tuning the amount of hishtadlus that is appropriate for YOU individually, should not be taken as an inference that Rav Mintzberg and Rav Avraham may be at odds over defining what is appropriate hishtadlus in general.

However, there was still something gnawing at me that I couldn't quite place and that unease led me to return to reviewing repeatedly my underlined passages in HaMaspik at an even faster pace, while also pausing to re-read and chew on some of the individual sentences, to ensure the accuracy of my thinking.

It then hit me that the reason that I was having difficulty fitting Rav Mintzberg into HaMaspik (or maybe it's the reverse, that the difficulty that I encountered was fitting Rav Avraham into Rav Mintzberg's box), was that as opposed to Rav Mintzberg, I had yet to see where Rav Avraham referred to the physical acts of hishtadlus in such positive terms as for example saying that the reason why you have to do hishtadlus is because in doing hishtadlus you are fulfilling the ratzon HaShem for how the world should run.

90 בן מלך
הרי מי שסומך ובוטח על הקב״ה ומניח עצמו להנהגתו יתברך, הרי עלי ו לנהוג כפי שקבע ה׳ בעולם שרק כך ישיג האדם צרכיו אלו, ויעשה פעולות השתדלו ת כשנצרך להשיג ענייניו, משום שכך הוא רצון ה', וכך קבע מנהיג העולם שהאדם יזדקק לפעולות אלו כדי להגיע לצרכיו.

Rav Avraham is much more about doing hishtadlus because if you don't it will lead to a chillul Hashem or because it shows a lack of wisdom in understanding how the world works. Rav Avraham is much more about taking the natural course of the way the world works, as a given. As something that a person much work with, but Rav Avraham does not get poetic about there being a ratzon HaShem that you are involved in bringing to fruition.

You could probably argue that when Rav Avraham refers to hishtadlus in a way that portrays as a fool the person who does not engage in hishtadlus, because that's just how the world works, end of story (which btw, is the nicest thing that Rav Avraham would have to say about this person). In which case, you could say that my insisting upon wanting to see such a positive expression along the lines of "doing the ratzon HaShem" is just being picky. But I'm not yet convinced.

I also began to question whether I had read too much into Rav Mintzberg's use of the term "ratzon HaShem" and other such terms and that perhaps Rav Mintzberg did not mean to put as much of a positive spin on it as I had inferred.

But there's more to my line of reasoning, that suggests a divergence between Rav Avraham ben HaRambam and Rav Mintzberg.

Rav Avraham continually makes the point that the most basic premise (ikar) of any balance between bitachon and hishtadlus (if there even is such a thing a balance that needs to be maintained between them), is that you need to do those things that shore up your bitachon first, before you engage in hishtadlus.

216 המספיק
לאור הדברים האלה חייב איפוא שומר הדת בשעה שהוא מקדיש את חילו לגורמים טבעיים ודברים רגילים כדי להפיק מהם תועלת ולהרחיק את הזקם שיהא בטחונו על ה' יתעלה. ויהא לבו תלוי בו בהפקת התועלת שהוא מקוה לה … לפני שיקדיש להם את חילו.

90 בן מלך
הרי מי שסומך ובוטח על הקב״ה ומניח עצמו להנהגתו יתברך, הרי עליו לנהוג כפי שקבע ה׳ בעולם שרק כך ישיג האדם צרכיו אלו, ויעשה פעולות השתדלות כשנצרך להשיג ענייניו, משום שכך הוא רצון ה', וכך קבע מנהיג העולם שהאדם יזדקק לפעולות אלו כדי להגיע לצרכיו.

90 בן מלך
הריהו נוהג בזה בהיפך מידת הבטחון, שאינו סומך ובוטח על ה׳ ואינו נותן אמון בהשגחתו, להניח עצמו על הנהגתו יתברך, שיהיה משיג צרכיו בדרך שקבע ה׳ עבורו, וכפי שמנחה אותו בדרכו של עולם, אלא רוצה שיתנו לו באופן אחר, כפי שנראה לו , ולא כפי שהקב״ה קבע, וזה היפך הבטחוך

105 בן מלך
ועל כל אחד להתאים את מעשי השתדלותו ופעולותיו לסדר ההנהגה המיוחד לו כפי שמבחין שקבעו עבורו מן השמים, ואין לו להתעקש ולהתנגד”, לא למעט בפעולות השתדלות, וגם שלא להוסיף ולהרבות בהשתדלות", אלא להיות בוטח וסומך על ה׳ שמנהיגים אותו באופן הנכון ביותר עבורו, ולהאמין כי כאשר יעסוק במידת ההשתדלות אשר נקבע עבורו יהיו לו צרכיו המגיעים לו כפי שנגזר עליו. ולא יתרעם ולא יתמרמר על מעמדו ומנת חלקו, אלא יהיה מרוצה ומסכים להנהגת ה׳ שנותן לו במידה זו, ובזה הוא בגדר בוטח בה׳, שבוטח בו ומניח עצמו לקביעתו והנהגתו.

My impression is that in Ben Melech, this is not even a theme mingled in with hishtadlus. The emphasis is on doing hishtadlus because it's in keeping with the ratzon HaShem. You don't see any discussion that for hishtadlus to have any value in terms of bitachon, the focus must be on the bitachon aspect, more than on the hishtadlus aspect.

Maybe again, perhaps I'm being too picky, but I get the impression from Ben Melech, that the hishtadlus (almost) stands on its own, as long as you keep in mind that the hishtadlus won't work unless there is geziras elyon (decreed by Hashem), that the hishtadlus should meet with success.

I began to ask myself where the disconnect was? Was it that I mis-read Ben Melech and put too much positive emphasis on the physical acts of hishtadlus? Or was it that what is written in Ben Melech is seriously at odds with what is written in HaMaspik? And if I found a real gap between Rav Mintzberg and Rav Avraham ben HaRambam, did Rav Mintzberg think that he and Rav Avraham were in sync with each other? Or was he well aware that he was saying one thing and Rav Avraham was saying another and Rav Mintzberg had other early sources that could support his thesis about the positive aspects of hishtadlus?

The Akeida, Ralbag and maybe Ramban have a take on hishtadlus that demands much more actual hishtadlus than Rav Mintzberg. At the same time, Rav Mintzberg's seeming positive attitude towards hishtadlus as being the ratzon HaShem, may not be shared by those same Rishonim (but it will need some review and thinking before I'm ready to say that they had a positive attitude towards hishtadlus).

To be fair, let's also keep in mind that at no time did Rav Mintzberg claim or even hint that his approach to hishtadlus is in sync or supported by Rav Avraham ben HaRambam. This was all my own fishing expedition, in an attempt to find a Rishon who can be used as support for what is written in Ben Melech about hishtadlus. So while it is likely that this was a "red herring" on my part, it is also likely that Rav Avraham ben HaRambam and Rav Mintzberg are using different approaches and are not in sync. The accomplishment of this effort has been that we've had to further concretize the boundaries of bitachon and hishtadlus according to Rav Mintzberg.

*** I will return to what I found in Hamaspik Le'Ovedei HaShem that I see as support for Ben Melech in another post

An earlier discussion of tefila as a form of hishtadlus

Back in late November/early December, when we were still in chapter 1, on page 91 in sefer Ben Melech, long before we took up the challenge to our understanding of the place of davening within hishtadlus that we faced on page 109, Ariel raised the point that tefila is also hishtadlus.

This is evident from the Mishna and Gemara at the end of Kiddushin (82a) cited in Ben Melech on page 100. In the Mishna we are taught,

רבי מאיר אומר לעולם ילמד אדם את בנו אומנות נקיה וקלה ויתפלל למי שהעושר והנכסים שלו שאין אומנות שאין בה עניות ועשירות שלא עניות מן האומנות ולא עשירות מן האומנות אלא הכל לפי זכותו

R. Meir said: One should always teach his son a clean and easy craft and pray to Him to whom all wealth and property belong. Every craft/trade can bring poverty or wealth, for neither poverty or wealth is due to the craft/trade, rather it all depends on a person's zechus (merit).

While in the Gemara on this Mishna we are taught a Baraisa that,

ר"מ אומר לעולם ילמד אדם לבנו אומנות נקיה וקלה ויבקש רחמים למי שהעושר והנכסים שלו שאין עניות מן האומנות ואין עשירות מן האומנות אלא למי שהעושר שלו שנאמר (חגי ב, ח) לי הכסף ולי הזהב ...

R. Meir said: One should always teach his son a clean and easy craft, and appeal for compassion from Him to Whom [all] wealth and property belong, for neither poverty nor wealth comes from one's calling, but from Him to whom wealth and property belong, as it is said: The silver is mine, and the gold is mine... (Chaggai 2:8).

Clearly, from both the Mishna's way of phrasing it as, ...AND pray to Him..., as well as the Gemara's way of phrasing it as, ...AND appeal for compassion..., it is clear that davening is an integral part of how we should do our hishtadlus.

It is equally clear from the Gemara in Nidda (70b) cited in Ben Melech at the top of page 97 that davening is an integral part of hishtadlus.The Gemara there relates a series of questions asked by the Men of Alexandria to R. Yehoshua. One of the questions was, what should one do in order to grow wealthy? R. Yehoshua answered that he should put much effort into commerce and deal honestly (Ed. Chazal understood that to 'deal honestly' is a way of attaining success in business b'darko shel olam). The Men of Alexandria challenged R. Yehoshua that many did so and they came up empty handed. R. Yehoshua replied that, rather, let him pray for compassion from Him, to whom belongs all riches, as it says, "Mine is the silver, and Mine the gold" (Chaggai 2:8). To which the Gemara asks, that if it all dependent upon beseeching HKBH for wealth, why did R. Yehoshua mention that the person should put much effort into commerce? The Gemara answers, to teach us, that one without the other is not sufficient to ensure the success of your hishtadlus efforts..

Additionally, it is also clear from the Gemara in Nidda that there are two separate channels in which hishtadlus must be done.
1) in the realm of teva - "put much effort into commerce and deal honestly"
2) in the realm of ruchniyus - where by deepening your relationship with HKBH, you will have the zechuyos to merit that the hanhagas Hashem/hashgacha pratis will bring your hishtadlus b'darko shel olam, aka. teva to fruition - "let him pray for compassion from Him..."

We have learned that if you don't do hishtadlus of the first (teva) type, you are contravening the ratzon Hashem and by right, you should not succeed. By not doing the proper hishtadlus, you have either, not created the receptacle to accept what HKBH what HKBH has decided to grant; or not created the pipeline through which HKBH will send what He wants to bestow upon you. As we have described it, you don't have a spoon with which to eat the soup. Based on what we've learned, you will probably only see success if HKBH has decided that "no ifs, ands or buts", you will receive what you anticipate getting (even without your proper hishtadlus. When the desired outcome is extremely basic to a person's needs, the possibility grows that HKBH will decree that the person should have the desired outcome, because that is the benevolence that HKBH bestows on all of His creations. We have also pointed out, that the more that the desired outcome moves beyond a person's basic core needs, the likelihood is greater that your success has more to do with what you will do with this success for someone else, than the success has to do with you, because you are flouting the ratzon HaShem and should by right, not have the zechus to merit this successful outcome on your own.

But what if we don't do the second ruchniyus/tefila type of hishtadlus?

It would seem that if you did the proper hishtadlus of the first (teva) kind, hishtadlus that should by nature bring success, there is a good chance that you will succeed, even without the second ruchniyus/tefila type of hishtadlus. The reason for this would be, that regardless of whether you intended to or not, you have done the ratzon HaShem, by doing hishtadlus b'darko shel olam. In addition, by doing so, you have created the receptacle that is poised to receive what HKBH is bestowing upon you (or created the pipeline through which HKBH will send what He wants to bestow upon you). The obvious exception would be where your zechuyos (merits) have suddenly taken a tumble and you have lost the zechus (merit) needed to have HKBH decree that your efforts will meet with success. Another exception being where the success is such, that by its very nature, from the very beginning, needed more zechusim than the person had in his account and by neglecting the ruchniyus element in the hishtadlus equation (e.g. davening), the person failed to reach the level of zechusim needed to have HKBH decree success upon his hishtadlus endeavor.
     

Davening as Hishtadlus II

Since the chabura's original discussion on whether tefila is another form of hishtadlus, there has been some thinking (offline) and the question arose from what we learned last year, as to whether the Chazon Ish might agree with Rav Leib Mintzberg (or at least with what understood Rav Mintzberg to have said), that tefila is another form of hishtadlus on its own. The Chazon Ish wrote in the last paragraph of the first chapter of his essay on bitachon:

גם עילות של ההצלה שטבעת בני האדם להשתדל בהן משתנות אצל הבוטח, כי תחת לרדוף אחר נדיבים ושרים ולבקש תחבולות שוא, יפשפש הבוטח במעשיו ויפנה את לבו לתשובה תפלה וצדקה להעביר רוע הגזירה.

which can be read as implying that the Chazon Ish is advocating that where a person is in dire need of help in a pressing situation, instead of undertaking any extreme hishtadlus, he should do hishtadlus of a ruchniyus fashion.

But a closer reading shows that this is not what the Chazon Ish meant. What the Chazon Ish is saying, is that instead of chasing after all kinds of futile hishtadlus stratagems to find the [self-serving, pompous high ranking or powerful person] who could possibly help (but in all likelihood won't), the person should turn to HaShem to be delivered from his predicament.

While looking for the exact words of the Chazon Ish, I stumbled across something that Rav Mintzberg has on page 25, which sheds light on what he wrote on what we had difficulty with on page 109. To top it off, Rav Mintzberg says that what he is saying (below) is the same idea as the Chazon Ish just quoted.

כמו כן יש הבדל בגישתו ובפעולותיו של הבוטח, כאשר מתרגש ובא מצב של סכנה ח״ו. שמאחר שרואה את הדברים במבט הנכון, הרי אף שמקדם את פני הרעה בהשתדלות הראויה, אך עיקר ההשתדלות שלו הוא בעניין התפילה והתחנונים, וימהר ויחיש לחזור בתשובה ולבקש סליחה ומחילה כדי לבטל את החטא שהוא הגורם כל הסכנה, ומוסיף ומרבה זכויות למצוא חן בעיני ה', וכן מתחזק בתפילה ובקשה מאת ה׳ שיושיעו מצרתו. ואינו רואה את תקוותו בהשתדלות ובסיבות שהכין להצלה, אלא סברו ותקוותו הוא על ה׳ שיחיש לו ישועה.

The key phrase is ikar ha-hishtadlus, which I take to as meaning: the pivotal hishtadlus. Davening is part and parcel of the entire package of hishtadlus that is being employed, it is not being used as an alternate form of hishtadlus on its own. Rather, it is being used as way of finding favor with HaShem, so that HaShem will decide that the person's hishtadlus should be successful. Because as we have said many times, at the end of the day, it isn't the hishtadlus that determines success. Rather, if HKBH determines that the person should meet with success, it will be materialized through hishtadlus. So we see that Rav Mintzberg is suggesting the use of tefila much the same way that we felt that tefila related to hishtadlus.

Ramban on why hishtadlus for curing illness is different

I really wanted to skip over chapter 2 and chapter 3 for the moment and comeback to them later. Both of these chapters get in the way of the main idea that we will learn in Ben Melech. In chapter 1 we learned that hishtadlus is not optional. We would be much better served by moving forward from chapter 1 directly to chapter 4, where Rav Mintzberg will begin to discuss the shiur (measure) for how much is the appropriate amount of hishtadlus.    

In chapter 3 of Ben Melech, Rav Leib Mintzberg starts by quoting, from the Gemara in Brachos 60a which brings a disagreement between Rav Acha and Abaye. Basically, Rav Acha is of the opinion that people should not go to doctors, while Abaye holds that they can go to doctors. Rav Acha says that sick people should pray to HaShem that they be cured and not go to doctors. Abaye disagrees and maintains that people are allowed to go to doctors to be healed, quoting as proof from Tana d'Vei Rav Yishmael, who learns from the verse, ורפוא ירפא - "and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed" (Shemos 21:19), that doctors are permitted to heal people. Rashi and Tosfos write that what the Baraisa is teaching us is that we might have thought that if HaShem made a person sick, then what business do I have to get involved and heal the person? Therefore the Torah tells us ורפוא ירפא - "and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed" (the Torah repeats the root of the word 'heal' רפא), to teach us that this is not the case. Doctors are permitted to treat people in all cases.      

The way that Rashi and Tosfos understand the Gemara, if the word 'heal' was only used once in the phrase, one might have thought that the permission that is granted to doctors to heal, is only when the doctor is healing wounds inflicted by human beings and not from natural diseases. We might have had the idea that if it was an natural illness, perforce decreed by HaShem, the doctor would be violating HaShem's will, by treating the person who is ill. And as the Rashba (Teshuvos HaRashba 1:413) adds, that for the patient, there is also a problem with going to a doctor. We might have thought that the patient should have faith in HaShem and pray to Him to take it away, just as HaShem brought it upon the person in the first place. In order to teach us that this understanding is incorrect and in fact, doctors are allowed to heal people in all cases, the Torah repeats the word 'heal' ורפוא ירפא. This teaches us, that a doctor is even permitted to heal an illness inflicted by HaShem and not just where healing is needed for a wound was inflicted by another human being. Likewise, it is not a lack of faith on the part of the patient to go to a doctor to be healed.

The Tur and Shulchan Aruch render the final halakha as being, "the Torah gave permission to doctors to heal people and it is a mitzvah and is covered under the general rule of preservation of human life; and if a doctor refrains from healing someone, he is a blood spiller". (YD 336:1)

נתנה התורה רשות לרופא לרפאות ומצוה היא ובכלל פיקוח נפש הוא ואם מו נע עצמו הרי זה שופך דמים

The Ramban had a different take on the place of doctors in Jewish life here. Among the points that the Ramban makes,

"What place do doctors have in the house of those who carry out the will of God, after He promised that `He will bless their bread and their water, and remove illness from their midst'?... 

...had they not been in the habit of resorting to medicine, a person who became sick because of his sin could have been healed through the will of God alone. However, since they resorted to medicines, God abandoned them to the vicissitudes of nature.

...the Torah lays down that the attacker must pay the medical expenses of the injured party (Exodus 21:18). But this is because Torah law does not rely on miracles, for God knew that `the needy will not cease from the midst of the earth' (Deuteronomy 15:11). But when a person's ways find favor in God's eyes, he has no business with doctors."    

(Ramban, Commentary on the Torah, Leviticus 26:11) 

This Ramban became a lightening rod for other Rishonim. You may remember that one of the sources brought in chapter 1 to buttress the idea that you must do thing in the normal way that people do things and are prohibited from relying on miracles, was the Akeidas Yitzchak by R. Yitzchak Arama. In Akeidas Yitzchak, immediately preceding the section quoted in chapter 1 of our Ben Melech, R Yitzchak Arama writes at length against the opinion of the Ramban. The entire citation in Hebrew can be found here

Now let's make it clear that the Ramban is not coming out against hishtadlus. The Ramban is quite vocal in favor of hishtadlus and unless we re-interpret the Ramban (which we just might, since everybody else alive seems to do that anyway), it would seem that the hishtadlus that the Ramban expects people to be doing is the hishtadlus of the Akeidas Yitzchak and the Ralbag. A hishtadlus that does not take darko shel olam into account. The only pre-requisite for a baal bitachon's hishtadlus is that he keep in mind that his hishtadlus will accomplish nothing without HKBH's dictating that what he did, should succeed. However, the Ramban sees illness as something out of the ordinary, not darko shel olam and therefore a person should take it as a message from HKBH that the person needs to do something to get back in HKBH's good graces. While the Tur and Shulchan Aruch understand ורפוא ירפא - and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed, to be telling us that illness is also darko shel olam and a person should do hishtadlus in the normal fashion in seeking medical treatment for whatever ails him.

So here Rav Mintzberg makes a point that is relevant to what we've learned until now. He says that we can take a lesson in analyzing all that occurs in our lives. The lesson that we can take from this understanding of the Ramban, is that the Ramban would agree that for something that occurs that IS darko shel olam and not something that he sees as totally out of the ordinary like illness, the proper hishtadlus would be to do whatever is darko shel olam. The lesson that we can take from this understanding of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch's position is, that the Tur and Shulchan Aruch would agree that if something occurred that is NOT darko shel olam then the proper approach would be to take it as a message from HKBH that he needs to do something to repair his relationship (I hate that word in this context) with HKBH. Of course, Rav Mintzberg ends off with the caveat that you need great wisdom to differentiate between when something is darko shel olam VS. when something is out of the ordinary, because in truth the question of whether something is just there, so that you can exert yourself or whether it's meant to be a direct communication from HKBH, alerting the person that something is amiss.

Rav Mintzberg suggests that a way to gauge what is going on, is by asking yourself whether this or things very similar to this have occurred in your life before? If things like this have happened before, it is more likely that it is just darko shel olam, while if this is something that is extraordinarily out of the ordinary, the likelihood that HKBH is telling you something, becomes greater.