As an opening salvo in his essay on hishtadlus, Rav Leib Mintzberg came down very strongly on the side that bitachon without hishtadlus doesn't fly. He proceeded to quote from four early sources (Rashba in Teshuvos HaRashba, Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos Ha-Levavos, Rav Yitzchak Arama in Akeidas Yitzchak and Ramchal in Mesilas Yesharim) to back up his contention. see post here. Considering that this does not seem to be his main thrust in this essay on hishtadlus and in fact seems to be a diversion from what will be his main theses on hishtadlus, we are interested in seeing whether the sources that Rav Mintzberg brings, have broader application than to just the limited case of a person who wants to rely on his bitachon and to do no hishtadlus whatsoever and in Rav Mintzberg's words, is relying on miracles to fulfill his needs.
We will attempt to test whether the ideas that Rav Mintzberg's presents later, such as the idea that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam can find any support among these four early sources that were brought to prove that at least some hishtadlus is mandatory. It is also possible that we will find that these four sources actually contradict Rav Mintzberg or at least cannot be proven to take one side or the other.
In this post, we'll take a closer look at the first source cited in Ben Melech, which was from a response written by the Rashba and printed in Tshuvos HaRashba vol I, responsa #413 as well as in Minchas Kenaos letter #3
We will attempt to test whether the ideas that Rav Mintzberg's presents later, such as the idea that minimal hishtadlus is not sufficient and that hishtadlus is gauged by what is darko shel olam can find any support among these four early sources that were brought to prove that at least some hishtadlus is mandatory. It is also possible that we will find that these four sources actually contradict Rav Mintzberg or at least cannot be proven to take one side or the other.
In this post, we'll take a closer look at the first source cited in Ben Melech, which was from a response written by the Rashba and printed in Tshuvos HaRashba vol I, responsa #413 as well as in Minchas Kenaos letter #3
וכן כתב הרשב״א באגרתו - ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין לו רשות לעשו ת
מלאכתו דרך בטחון, רק בררנו של עולם ובו', ואין זה ממעט בטחון, אדרבה אסו ר
לסמוך על הנס (ספר מנתת קנאות מכתב ג׳).
We'll start our analysis by continuing to quote the Rashba, from where the quote of the Rashba in Ben Melech ends, until the end of the paragraph.
ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין
לו רשות לעשות מלאכתו דרך בטחון רק בדרכו של עולם, שלא יאמר אדליק
נר ביין או במים ואסמוך על הנס, ואע"פ שאמר החסיד לבתו ששגה בע"ש
ושמה יין בנר במקום שמן ונצטערה, בתי אל תצטערי, מי שאמר לשמן וידליק, יאמר ליין
וידליק.
We now get a totally different picture of what the Rashba said. When reading this passage in the Rashba as quoted in Ben Melech, you get the impression that even the most righteous have to do hishtadlus that is b'darko shel olam. Leaving us to interpret b'darko shel olam as Ben Melech usually does, i.e. doing the amount of hishtadlus which under normal conditions can be expected to deliver the desired results.
But by reading the extra few words, we see that while it is clear that the Rashba is still supporting the idea that a person is not allowed to rely on miracles, however, he is defining miracles quite differently than Rav Mintzberg does. He defines miracles as doing things that stray from the laws of nature and expecting that the outcome will still be as he anticipates. The Rashba's example is somewhat extreme and therefore the application to more normative situations is extremely limited. His example is of a person who lights a lamp filled with water or wine instead of oil, with the expectation that it will burn. This person is obviously looking for a real 'parting of the Red Sea' type of miracle, not your garden variety type of miracle, such as a person not having a job and opening the mail to find a check inside an envelope addressed to him, for which the explanation of the timing is quite fantastic, since he had not known that his mother had a great-uncle, who all of a sudden, in his hoary old-age, had this need to show gratitude for something that his grandmother had done almost a century before, when she knit him a sweater for his birthday, when he was six years old and everybody had been so busy trying to survive, that they had all but forgotten his birthday.
In fact, the Rashba really isn't a proof to Rav Mintzberg at all. Rav Mintzberg's strong words were aimed at condemning the person who intends to rely on his bitachon sans any hishtadlus, because the person is violating the dictum that we don't rely on miracles. However, the Rashba is talking about miracles of Biblical (or at least Talmudic) proportions, he never said anything about your ordinary plain vanilla miracles that stay well within the boundaries of the physical (and other) laws of nature. The passage from the Rashba that is cited in Ben Melech can not be taken as an indication to what the Rashba would say about a person using his bitachon to rely on what is ostensibly a plain vanilla miracle.
btw. having not thought about this enough, it would be interesting to spend the time to formulate what it is that happens that we call a miracle. It seems at first glance that what we call a miracle is all about timing. Timing as in coincidence that a seed planted many years before, sprouts results when you most need it. Timing as in things happening one after another in quick sequence to deliver a desired result. Timing as happening when you or someone else is in a particular place.
So when the Rashba states that even a very saintly person has no right to go about his chores relying on his bitachon and instead, must act only b'darko shel olam, he uses the expression b'darko shel olam to mean nothing more than doing things in a way that doesn't violate the basic laws of nature (physics etc). In addition, nothing can be extracted from the Rashba to prove anything one way or the other, about a person who does a minimal amount of hishtadlus since that is not the situation that the Rashba is addressing. The Rashba is not addressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of hishtadlus, he is stressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of not relying on miracles that break the bounds of physics.
But things are not so simple. If we take a look at the whole passage from the top, we see that in truth, the Rashba may be able to be used as support for Rav Mintzberg's ideas after all. In the passage below the Rashba writes that it is forbidden to rely on miracles. But here we read that the kind of miracle that you are forbidden to rely on, is to rely on a miracle that you can pass safely under a wall on the verge of collapse. In which case, the Rashba clearly supports Rav Mintzberg's contention that there is a hishtadlus requirement to avoid relying on miracles of even the most pedestrian kind.
But by reading the extra few words, we see that while it is clear that the Rashba is still supporting the idea that a person is not allowed to rely on miracles, however, he is defining miracles quite differently than Rav Mintzberg does. He defines miracles as doing things that stray from the laws of nature and expecting that the outcome will still be as he anticipates. The Rashba's example is somewhat extreme and therefore the application to more normative situations is extremely limited. His example is of a person who lights a lamp filled with water or wine instead of oil, with the expectation that it will burn. This person is obviously looking for a real 'parting of the Red Sea' type of miracle, not your garden variety type of miracle, such as a person not having a job and opening the mail to find a check inside an envelope addressed to him, for which the explanation of the timing is quite fantastic, since he had not known that his mother had a great-uncle, who all of a sudden, in his hoary old-age, had this need to show gratitude for something that his grandmother had done almost a century before, when she knit him a sweater for his birthday, when he was six years old and everybody had been so busy trying to survive, that they had all but forgotten his birthday.
In fact, the Rashba really isn't a proof to Rav Mintzberg at all. Rav Mintzberg's strong words were aimed at condemning the person who intends to rely on his bitachon sans any hishtadlus, because the person is violating the dictum that we don't rely on miracles. However, the Rashba is talking about miracles of Biblical (or at least Talmudic) proportions, he never said anything about your ordinary plain vanilla miracles that stay well within the boundaries of the physical (and other) laws of nature. The passage from the Rashba that is cited in Ben Melech can not be taken as an indication to what the Rashba would say about a person using his bitachon to rely on what is ostensibly a plain vanilla miracle.
btw. having not thought about this enough, it would be interesting to spend the time to formulate what it is that happens that we call a miracle. It seems at first glance that what we call a miracle is all about timing. Timing as in coincidence that a seed planted many years before, sprouts results when you most need it. Timing as in things happening one after another in quick sequence to deliver a desired result. Timing as happening when you or someone else is in a particular place.
So when the Rashba states that even a very saintly person has no right to go about his chores relying on his bitachon and instead, must act only b'darko shel olam, he uses the expression b'darko shel olam to mean nothing more than doing things in a way that doesn't violate the basic laws of nature (physics etc). In addition, nothing can be extracted from the Rashba to prove anything one way or the other, about a person who does a minimal amount of hishtadlus since that is not the situation that the Rashba is addressing. The Rashba is not addressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of hishtadlus, he is stressing darko shel olam as a characteristic of not relying on miracles that break the bounds of physics.
But things are not so simple. If we take a look at the whole passage from the top, we see that in truth, the Rashba may be able to be used as support for Rav Mintzberg's ideas after all. In the passage below the Rashba writes that it is forbidden to rely on miracles. But here we read that the kind of miracle that you are forbidden to rely on, is to rely on a miracle that you can pass safely under a wall on the verge of collapse. In which case, the Rashba clearly supports Rav Mintzberg's contention that there is a hishtadlus requirement to avoid relying on miracles of even the most pedestrian kind.
וזה דרך הקמיעין בין קמיע של כתב בין של
עקרין, וכן כל מ"ש בשבת ובחולין ובע"ז ובסנהדרין וגם בשאר מקומות שכתבנו
למעלה, והוא שאמרו אביי ורבא כל שיש בו משום רפואה אין בו משום דרכי האמורי, ולא
עוד אלא שאסור לכנוס בעניני הסכנות ולבטוח על הנס, והוא אמרו: קיר נטוי מזכיר
עון, ואמרו כל הסומך על הנס אין עושין נס, ומותר לבטוח באדם, והוא שלא יסור לבו
מן ה', כאמרו: ארור הגבר אשר שם בשר זרועו ומן השם יסור לבו, אך לבטוח בה'
שיעשה לו תשועה על ידי איש פלוני מותר ומצוה, וזה כולל כל עסקי בני אדם
במלאכתם, זולתי האנשים השלמים שזכיותיהם מרובות כמעשה דר' חנינא בן דוסא עם הערוד,
שאמרו אוי לו לאדם שפגע בו ערוד, ואוי לו לערוד שפגע בו ר"א בן דוסא, וכמעשה
דרבי חנינא בן דוסא (חולין ז, ב) שהיתה אותה אשה מחזרת לטול עפר מתחת רגליו לכשפים
וא"ל שקילי, אין עוד לבדו כתיב, והאמר מר למה נקראו כשפים, לפי שמכחישין
פמליא של מעלה? והשיב שאני ר"ח בן דוסא דנפיש זכותיה, ואפילו החסיד שבחסידים אין
לו רשות לעשות מלאכתו דרך בטחון רק בדרכו של עולם, שלא יאמר אדליק
נר ביין או במים ואסמוך על הנס, ואע"פ שאמר החסיד לבתו ששגה בע"ש
ושמה יין בנר במקום שמן ונצטערה, בתי אל תצטערי, מי שאמר לשמן וידליק, יאמר ליין
וידליק.
So in summary, perhaps the Rashba can be used as somewhat of a proof for denigrating the faux-bitachon in the extreme scenario that Rav Mintzberg chose to use, i.e. no hishtadlus whatsoever. Additionally, the Rashba may support Rav Mintzberg's main theses, that a person doing minimal hishtadlus is behaving badly and is showing that he has no real bitachon in HaShem. In fact, Rav Mintzberg never indicated that the Rashba supports his idea about ba'alei bitachon behaving recklessly, so we shouldn't be too surprised if the Rashba doesn't support Rav Mintzberg's idea. Likewise, it would be a serious mis-reading of the Rashba, to take from Rav Mintzberg's presentation, that the Rashba intended to use the phrase b'darko shel olam in the way that Rav Mintzberg will use it in the rest of his essay on hishtadlus.
This is important, because from the way that Ben Melech smoothly transitions from discussing the person who does no hishtadlus, to the person who does less hishtadlus than can normally be expected to deliver the positive results desired, you can get the mistaken impression that just as the four early sources support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does no hishtadlus, so too they support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does minimal hishtadlus, when in fact, they do not. Furthermore, by cutting off the Rashba in mid-sentence and not sharing the extreme context that the Rashba is addressing i.e. a person attempting to light wine, with the expectation that it will burn like oil, Rav Mintzberg inadvertently concealed from the reader, the obvious conclusion that the Rashba did not mean to use the term b'darko shel olam to mean what Rav Mintzberg does with the term for the rest of this essay in Ben Melech.
This is important, because from the way that Ben Melech smoothly transitions from discussing the person who does no hishtadlus, to the person who does less hishtadlus than can normally be expected to deliver the positive results desired, you can get the mistaken impression that just as the four early sources support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does no hishtadlus, so too they support Rav Mintzberg's perspective on the person who does minimal hishtadlus, when in fact, they do not. Furthermore, by cutting off the Rashba in mid-sentence and not sharing the extreme context that the Rashba is addressing i.e. a person attempting to light wine, with the expectation that it will burn like oil, Rav Mintzberg inadvertently concealed from the reader, the obvious conclusion that the Rashba did not mean to use the term b'darko shel olam to mean what Rav Mintzberg does with the term for the rest of this essay in Ben Melech.
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